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of certiorari1 5 or appeal' 6 to the United States Supreme Court if a
federal question has arisen and been properly presented. If new ma-
terial appears17 and time for an appeal has expired,' a petition for writ
of error coram nobis should be filed 19 in the trial court.20 From the
decision on this petition, an appeal must be prosecuted to the Indiana
Supreme Court; 2' then he must petition for writ of certiorari
22 or
appeal23 to the United States Supreme Court, if the federal question
has been properly saved. These procedures failing, one may then peti-
tion the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus based upon
federal questions which the United States Supreme Court has previ-
ously neither reviewed nor declined to review.2 '
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
RIGHT OF BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS TO FILL
VACANCY
Incumbent township trustee was committed to the state hospital
for insane. The Board of County Commissioners appointed X to fill the
vacancy.' On appeal by taxpayers, Circuit Court declared appointment
void. Appellate Court affirmed on the ground that insanity of an office-
15. 43 Stat. 936 (1925), 28 U.S.C.A. § 344 (b) (1928); Rule 38 (1939)
Rules of the Supreme Court, 306 U.S. 716.
16. 43 Stat. 936 (1925), 45 Stat. 54 (1928), 28 U.S.C.A. § 344 (a)
(1928); Rule 36 (1) (1939) Rules of the Supreme Court, 306 U.S.
714. See Stephanson v. Daly, 1 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ind. 1932).
17. Sufficiency of a petition for writ of error coram nobis and of
evidence to sustain it are tested by the rules pertaining to motions
for a new trial because of newly discovered evidence. Swain v. State,
215 Ind. 259, 18 N.E. (2d) 921 (1939); Hicks v. State, 213 Ind.
277, 11 N.E. (2d) 171, 1,2 N.E. (2d) 501 (1938); Berry v. State,
212 Ind. 294, 165 N.E. 61, 173 N.E. 705 (1930).
18. The trial court has no authority to grant a writ of error coram
nobis while a petition for rehearing or an appeal is pending. Part-
low v. State, 191 Ind. 657, 134 N.E. 483 (1922); Westfall v. Wait,
161 Ind. 449, 68 N.E. 1009 (19-0); State ex rel. Terre Haute v.
Kolsem, 130 Ind. 434, 435, 29 N.E. 595 (1892).
19. Ex parte Botwinski, 314 U.S. 586 (1942); Jones v. Dowd, 128 F.
(2d) 331 (C.C.A. 7th, 1942); Davis v. Dowd, 119 F. (2d) 338 (1941).
20. Writ of error coram nobis must be brought in the court rendering
judgment. See State ex rel. Kunkel v. LaPorte Circuit Court, 209
Ind. 682, 687, 200 N.E. 614, 616 (1936); Partlow v. State, 191 Ind.
657, 658, 134 N.E. 483, 484 (1922).
21. Ex parte Davis, 318 U.S. 412 (1943); State ex rel. Kunkel v. La-
Porte Circuit Court, 209 Ind. 682, 687, 200 N.E. 614, 616 (1936).
See Rules of the Indiana Supreme Court, Rule 2-40, adopted May
29, 1945, for procedure on appeal from an order on a petition for a
writ of error coram nobis.
22. See n. 14 supra.
23. See n. 15 supra.
24. Ex part Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944).




holder does not create a vacancy. 2 Held: reversed with instructions to
dismiss. The court had no jurisdiction to review by appeal the appoint-
ment by the Board. Board of County CommWrs. of Dearborn Co. v.
Droge, 68 N.E. (2d) 650 (Ind. 1946).
The Board did not declare a vacancy, but merely flled it. Its
action was purely ministerial,s and no appeal from it will lie, since not
specifically authorized by statute.4 If no vacancy existed, the Board's
action was improper and can be tested in a proper action. 5
The policy of many states is declared by constitutional or stat-
utory provision precluding the insane from public office.6 The pro-
tection of public interests requires that an office be considered vacant
when the incumbent is completely incapacitated by insanity from per-
forming his non-delegable duties.7
TAXATION
STATE TAXATION OF LEASEHOLD INTEREST IN PROPERTY
OWNED BY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
Recent disproval of property by the federal government, on lease
and conditional sales terms, has sharply focused the problems inherent
in the broad principle that federally owned property is exempt from
state taxation.' Included in the question whether a state may tax a
leasehold interest possessed by a person, otherwise not tax exempt, when
the lessor is the United States. The solution to the above is dependent
upon the answer to the following questions:
a. May a leasehold interest in tax exempt property be sep-
arated from the interest of the owner in fee for tax purposes?
b. Where the federal government owns the reversion, would
such a tax be prohibited by the implied immunity of the federal
government from state taxation?
2. 66 N.E.(2d) 134 (Ind. App. 1946).
3. State v. Harrison, 113 Ind. 434, 16 N.E. 384 (1887), 3 Am. St. Rep.
663 (1888).
4. State v. Circuit Court, 214 Ind. 323, 15 N.E.(2d) 624 (1938); Bun-
nell v. Board, 124 Ind. 1, 24 N.E. 370 (1889); Platter v. Board, 103
Ind. 360, 2 N.E. 544 (1885); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 65-106.
5. The proper procedure would be for the claimant to the office to
file an information in the nature of quo warranto as set forth
in Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 3-2001 to 3-2014, and described
in McGuirk v. State, 201 Ind. 650, 169 N.E. 521 (1930).
6. Illustrative constitutional provisions are: Minn. Const. Art VII, § 2;
Nebr. Const. Art. I1, § 23; R. I. Const. Art. II, § 4 and Art. IX,
§ 1. The statutes usually disqualify a general class of persons,
and the insane are included in that class by court interpretation:
e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942) § 446.010 (27); Mass. G. L. 1932,
c. 211, § 4.
7. in re Killeen, 121 Misc. 482, 201 N.Y. Supp. 209 (Sup. Ct. 1923);
People v. Robb, 33 N. Y. S. R. 808, 11 N.Y. Supp. 383 (Sup. Ct.
1890).
1. See Rice, "Problems of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Arising
out of Federal Contract Termination and Property Disposal" (1945)
54 Yale L. J. 665.
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